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DuPont shareholders, giving them full rights as General Motors
shareholders at General Motors meetings. Furthermore, no DuPont
representatives were to sit on the Board of General Motors.
This is an ingenious solution that should remove all taint from
the investment, even where the most zealous "trustbusters" on the
Supreme Court are concerned. It is amusing to reflect that Frankfurter J., who wrote such a scathing indictment of the Court in the
dissent, was appointed by President Roosevelt for his liberal views,
and was generally regarded by American conservatives as a fiery
radical. The Warren Court has been the centre of controversy for
six years because of its alleged "legislative" actions. If Justice Frankfurter's views be correct, then the Court was here overturning judicial
precedent to carry out a legislative objective.
The American Constitution is built on the premises that functions are divided between the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
branches of Government. It is true that a certain overlap is necessary, but it is questionable whether an appointed Court should usurp
the functions of the democratically elected legislature. If LaBuy J.'s
settlement is upset by the Supreme Court in favour of the Government's plan, then the question of the Court's role will become a
vitally important political question, since the resultant economic dislocation will frustrate the legislator's plans for a booming economy.
A Bill was introduced in the American Senate last year which
sought to curb the Supreme Court from some of its more enthusiastic
ventures. It was voted down, but the fact that a number of distinguished legislators voted for it shows how deep the mistrust of
the Supreme Judicial authority is in many thoughtful quarters. This
reprimand may well be instrumental in preventing the Court from
overruling the learned District Court Judge. If his decision stands,
it could quite conceivably be a watershed in the annals of Government regulation of business for its judicious balancing of the respective interests of the general public and the investor.
DONALD COCK*

HARGREAVES v. BRETHERTON TORT EDY The claims of those who have

PERJURY -

LACK OF REM-

suffered from the abuses of
judicial proceedings have for centuries been faced with the rule that:
neither party, witness, counsel, jury, or Judge, can be put to answer,
civilly or criminally, for words spoken in office.1
...

The issue was recently raised again in the English case of
Hargreaves v. Bretherton,2 a decision of the Queen's Bench Division
*Mr. Cock is in the Third Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
I Rex v. Skinner (1772), Lofft 55 at p. 56, 98 E.R. at p. 530.
For the problems of tort liability arising from activities of public servants see R. J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 Calif. L. Rev.
(1959).
2 [1958] 3 W.L.R. 463, [1958] 3 All E.R. 122.
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which has been followed in Canada in Oak v. FrobisherLtd.,3 a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench.
In the Hargreaves case it was alleged, in the statement of claim,
that the defendant falsely and maliciously and without just occasion
or excuse committed perjury and that it was a reasonable and probable consequence of the aforesaid perjury that the plaintiff was
convicted. The alleged perjury had been committed during a criminal trial under the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939,
which resulted in the plaintiff being sentenced to eight years preventive detention. The issue before the court was whether an action
lies at the suit of the person who states that he has been damnified
by false evidence given against him.
Before discussing the decision of the court an examination of
earlier decisions is in order.
As early as 1596 a similar issue was raised in the case of
Damport v. Sympson.4 There a witness had falsely sworn that a
silver fountain valued at £500 was worth only £180 by reason of
which the jury gave only £200 damages. The plaintiff sued the
witness for the difference but it was held an action did not lie for
the following reasons:
(a) The law intends the oath of all to be true.
(b) Such perjury can be punished by statute and if a civil action
was allowed it would be double punishment which is not
reasonable.
(c) If there was such an action there would be a precedent by
this time, but as there is not, it is a good argument that
the action is not maintainable.
(d) Perjury is not punishable at common law and it did not
become a criminal offence justicable in the ordinary courts
until the reign of Elizabeth.
(e) An action based on such an order necessarily involved an
inquiry into what the jury would have given by way of
increased damages if it were not for the perjury, and that
could not be tried. If it were otherwise, the evidence of every
witness might be questioned.
In 1620, one Eyres sued a bailiff named Sedgewicke in a situation where no inquiry of the jury's action was necessary. 5 Here the
bailiff had allowed a prisoner to escape, and to cover his incompetence, he made a false affidavit in Chancery alleging that the
plaintiff Eyres had by force rescued the prisoner. In consequence
of the bailiff's perjury Eyres was imprisoned and upon release sued
3 (1959), 27 W.W.R. 594.
4 (1596), Cro. Eliz. 520, 78 E.R. 769.
5

Eyres v. Sedgewicke (1620), Cro. Jac. 601, 79 E.R. 513.
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the bailiff and proved his case to the satisfaction of a jury. A
motion in arrest of judgment, however, held that there was no such
action.
Sir John Holt C.J. in 1703 expressed the rule: 6
If one perjures himself in a cause to the damage of another person who
is either plaintiff or defendant no action upon the case lies: nor is It
reason it should, for the perjury is a crime of so high a nature that it
concerns all mankind to have it punished, which cannot be an action
upon the case, where nothing but damages shall be recovered by the
party injured, which is not sufficient to secure the public against so
dangerous a creature who hath offended against the common justice of
the kingdom. Therefore, for examples sake and public security the
prosecution of such an offence is vested in the Crown.

In face of such failure various attempts were made to frame
the action differently, one of which was libel; it also proved unsuc-

cessful. Then, in 1856, after the tort of malicious prosecution had
been recognized, an attempt was made to draft an action analogous
to it. The action in Revis v. Smith7 alleged falsity, malice and ab-

sence of reasonable cause. The court held no action was maintainable against a witness though he speak maliciously and falsely.
Thus, the auctioneer who had been deprived by the court of the
control of a sale due to a false affidavit as to his sharp business
practices, had no remedy for the £500 of lost fees.
It was argued on behalf of the auctioneer that the rule against
double punishment was no longer valid law in that there were
now several legal wrongs for which there were both civil and criminal penalties; and further, that many of the old cases were overruled
since actions for malicious prosecutions were now allowed and therefore there was no longer an absolute privilege for the abuse of
judicial proceedings. Creswell J. replied: 8
It is enough to say the world has gone on very well without such actions
as these; and I doubt whether it would continue to do so if such things
were allowed.
Public policy was the basis of the ruling in Dawkins v. Lord

Rokeby 9 when Lord Chief Baron (Sir F. Kelly) stated:' 0

The principle, we apprehend, is that public policy requires that witnesses should give their testimony free from any fear of being harassed
by an action on an allegation, whether true or false, that they acted
from malice.
...

In 1905, the House of Lords dealt with slanderous evidence"

12
and the Earl of Halsbury L.C. stated:

By complete authority, including the authority of this House, it has
been decided that the privilege of a witness, the immunity from responsibility in an action when evidence has been given by him in a Court
6 Ashby v. White, 25 Ruling Cases 52 at p. 75.
7

(1856), 18 C.B. 126, 139 E.R. 1314.

s Supra, footnote 7 at p. 141.
9 (1875), L.R. 7 H.L. 744.
lO Ibid., at p. 753.
l1
Watson v. McEwan, (19051 A.C. 480.
12
Ibid., at p. 486.
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of Justice, is too well established now to be shaken. Pactically I may

say that in my view it is absolutely unarguable-it is settled law and
cannot be doubted. The remedy against a witness who has given evidence which is false and injurious to another is to indict him for perjury.
A further variation 13 failed recently in Australia where the
claimant alleged "conspiracy with others to defraud the plaintiff by
the giving of false evidence". The court indicated the plaintiff's only
remedy was an equitable proceeding to set aside the judgment on the
basis of fraud. But Williams J. stated: 14
I have been unable to find any case in which a judgment has been set
aside when the only fraud alleged was that the defendant or a witness
or witnesses alone or in concert had committed perjury.
It was therefore with no great difficulty that the court in
Hargreaves v. Bretherton1 5 dismissed the action. Lord Goddard C.J.
went so far as to say the action was an obvious "try on". 1 6 The
Chief Justice stated that the rule of absolute privilege as set out
in Rex v. Skinner17 is firmly supported by precedent and is still valid
law. With respect, such is not the case in either England or Canada.
A witness is not immune from criminal liability for perjury' 8 nor
does the rule account for punishment for contempt of court. 19
From this it would appear that the ancient policy consideration
of protecting the witness from liability in order that he testify freely,
as enounced in Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby 20 and Watson v. McEwan,21
lacks validity in the face of these sanctions. It necessarily follows
that once a portion of the privilege for perjury is removed, there is
no logic in retaining the balance against civil actions.
Practically, it could be questioned how many witnesses are
aware of the privilege and testify only because they know of their
immunity to civil actions. If some do, it is submitted that the court
would be better served without their testimony. To state otherwise,
and for the courts to hold differently is to encourage the prostitution
of the judicial process. For is not the implication, in the policy
that witnesses must be undeterred by fear of actions, that the judicial
system has no other guarantees to protect the witness who has
honoured his oath and testified truthfully? If our courts are courts
13

Cabassi v. Vila (1940), 64 C.L.R. 130.

14
Ibid., at p. 147.
15

Supra, footnote 2.
16 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 468.
17 Supra, footnote 1, 'Neither party, witness, counsel, jury, or judge,
can be put to answer, civilly or criminally, for words spoken in office."
Is Canadian Criminal Code.
S. 112. Every one commits perjury who, being a witness in a judicial
proceeding, with intent to mislead gives false evidence, knowing that the
evidence is false.
S. 114. (1) Every one who commits perjury is guilty of an indictable
offence and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years, but if he commits
perjury to procure the conviction of a person for an offence punishable by
death, he is liable to imprisonment for life.
19 See, In the Matter of Lewis Duncan, [1958) S.C.R. 41.
20 Supra, footnote 9.
21 Supra, footnote 11.
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of justice, surely such a witness should have no tribulations that
need protection by this absolute privilege.
Part of the difficulty originates in the historical fact that the
absolute privilege rule was developed to protect witnesses from
defamation actions and was later adopted by the courts in perjury
cases. It is questioned whether such an adoption was judicious. If
the reasoning above is accepted-i.e., that the honest witness should
not require the privilege-then the extension of the rule was unnecessary. Further, if one is slandered in court he suffers only a
possible loss of reputation; but if one is perjured he can be imprisoned or may even lose a civil suit--either of which could be equally
as injurious as defamation.
Secondly, the Chief Justice expressed concern that an action
for damages for alleged perjury could be brought, not only when
there had been no conviction for perjury, but on the evidence of a
single witness, while he could not be convicted in a court of criminal
jurisdiction without the concurring testimony of two.2 It is submitted that such is not a reason on which to rest a decision but is
only a caution to be exercised if such an action were to be allowed.
In so stating his alarm, Goddard C.J. could not have considered
the judgment of his own court in Hornal v. Neuberger Products
Ltd.23 which held where fraud or other matter, which is or may
be a crime, is alleged against a party or against persons not parties
to the action, the standard of proof to be applied is that applicable
in civil actions, and not the higher standard of proof required in
criminal matters. To remove all concern it could be made a condition precedent
of the civil action that there be a conviction for
24
perjury.
Fear of an abundance of such actions if allowed-especially since
there is Legal Aid-was Lord Goddard's next reason for disallowing
the action. It is submitted that this is a fallacious basis-if it is a
basis-on which to rest a judgment. Would the Chief Justice have
disallowed the tort of negligence if its present prominence could
have been foreseen? Surely his concern over a multitude of penniless
plaintiffs is also unwarranted and hardly deserves comment. There
are few cases to-day involving perjury and there is no reason to
suggest that if there was a civil remedy the number of cases would
increase.
22 Canadian Criminal Code.

S. 115. No person shall be convicted of an offence under section 113 or
114 upon the evidence of only one witness unless the evidence of that witness
is corroborated in a material particular by evidence that implicates the
accused.
23 [1957] 1 Q.B. 247.
24 See Smith v. Selwyn, [1914] 3 K.B. 98. A plaintiff against whom a
felony has been committed by the defendant cannot make that felony the
foundation of a cause of action unless the defendant has been prosecuted
or a reasonable excuse has been given for his not having been prosecuted.
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Lastly he states that the penalty for committing perjury is not
that one should be asked to pay damages but that he should be
sentenced for the crime which he has committed. This harks back
to the rule against double punishment which is clearly no longer
valid law. Thus, there would appear to be no valid explanation why
the injured party should be barred from indemnification, which
would in addition, serve as a further deterrent against perjury.
In conclusion it is submitted that the only true basis for Lord
Goddard's judgment is that precedent prevents such an action. This
rests on the old basis of the absolute privilege principle not to deter
the free flow of witnesses. This principle has been undermined by
the sanctions now enforced and thus there is little reason to allow
this historical dogma to dictate modern thought.
Undoubtedly, however, legislation is now necessary to make
perjury tortious. It is no longer sufficient to state, as the courts
have done, that the "world has gone on very well without such
actions". 25 The truth is that much hardship has occurred.
H. LORNE MORPHY

REGIS PROPERTY V. DUDLEY -

LANDLORD AND TENANT -

REPAIRS

-

EXCEPTION OF FAIR WEAR AND TEAR - EFFECT OF ExcEpTIoN - The
recent House of Lords decision in Regis Property Co. Ltd. v. Dudley1
seems to have resulted in a new interpretation of the fair wear and
tear exception clause found in the tenant's repairing covenant of
most leases. A sample of a covenant to repair may be found in the
Short Form of Leases Act. 2 The previous law as stated in Taylor
v. Webb 3 appears to have been overruled.
Before discussing what the fair wear and tear exception is, and
how it may now be redefined, it is necessary to review the law prior
to the Taylor v. Webb case, as an aid in seeing how the court in
Regis Propertyarrived at its present position.
In Gutteridge v. Munyard,4 Tindal C.J. stated the effect, of a
repairing covenant containing an exception of reasonable wear and
tear in these words:
What the natural operation of time flowing on effects, and all that the
elements bring about in diminishing the value, constitute a loss, which,
so far as it results from time and nature, falls upon the landlord. But
25
Supra, footnote 7, at p. 141.
-Mr. Morphy is in the Third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [1958] 3 All E.R. 491 (H.L.).
2R.S.O. 1950, c. 361. "And also will, during the said term, well and
sufficiently repair, maintain, amend and keep the said demised premises
with the appurtenances in good and substantial repair, and all fixtures and
things thereto belonging, or which at any time during the said term shall be
erected and made by the lessor, when, where, and so often as need shall be,
reasonable wear and tear and damage by fire, lightning and tempest only
excepted."
3 [1937] 1 All E.R. 590.
4173 E.R. 57, (1834), 7 Car. & P. 129, 174 E.R. 114, (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 334.

